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CASE COMMENTS
AGBICULTURE--MEmDE or CO-OPERATrVE AssooTiON HELD TO VIOLNET
AGREEENT BY FAILURE TO SEE THAT TOBACCO RAISED ON LAND LEASFD TO
ANOTHER IS MARKETED ACCORDING TO AGEEEENT.-Defendant, a land-

owner and tobacco grower, joined plaintiff association in 1922. For
two years thereafter he raised and delivered tobacco in accordance with
his agreement with the association. In 1924 he leased his farm without restriction or limitation as to the kind or quantity of crops to be
grown thereon and moved out of the state. The tenant agreed to pay
$300 as rent but did not agree to pay any part of the crops. Nothing
was said about growing tobacco on the farm and the tenant was not a
member of the pool. The tenant planted a crop of tobacco and raised
about 4,775 pounds which he sold on the loose leaf market without the
consent of plaintiff association. This suit was brought by plaintiff asso.
ciation to recover five cents per pound as liquidated damages, and
costs in accordance with the provisions of the association agreement.
Held, defendant violated the agreement by failing to see that tobacco
raised on land leased to another was marketed according to the agreement. Dark Tobacco GrowersF Co-operative Association v. Daniels, 215
Ky. 399, 284 S. W. 399.
Defendant in becoming a member of the association agreed that
"If he produces any tobacco or acquires or owns any interest in tobacco
as landlord or lessor during the term thereof, it shall be included under
the terms of this agreement and must be sold only to the association."
Also, that "He shall deliver all the tobacco produced by or for him,
-

.

.

.

and all tobacco owned or produced by him

....

or

that he has the legal right to exercise any control over or any commercial tobacco or any interest therein as producer or landlord during the
term of this contract." The foregoing quotations are parts of sections
11 and 13a of the marketing agreement. Section 12 of the agreement
provides, in part, that: "This agreement shall be binding upon the
grower as long as he produces tobacco directly or indirectly, or has the
legal right to exercise control over or any interest therein as producer
or landlord during the terms of his contract."
Defendant relied upon these sections of the marketing agreement
to show that his contract with the association only required him to
deliver to it such tobacco as he produced or acquired or owned any
interest in as landlord or lessor, and did not require him to deliver or
cause to be delivered tobacco raised by a tenant paying money rent
upon land owned by defendant where he had no interest in the tobacco
as grower or landlord by purchase or otherwise. The plaintiff contends that section 18c of the Bingham Co-operative Marketing Act
enters into and becomes one of the terms of the contract. This section
of the Bingham Act provides, in substance, that a landlord is conclusively presumed to have the power to control delivery of crops grown
on his land. In construing this section of the Bingham Act the court
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in the case of Feagain v. Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Association, 202 Ky. 802, 261 S. W. 607, said: "The purpose of the statute was
to afford the growers an opportunity to avail themselves of the advantages of a co-operative market. To this end it provides that the association and its members may make and execute marketing contracts, requiring the members to sell for any period of time, not over ten years,
all or any specified part of their agricultural products exclusively to or
through the association, or any facilities to be created by the association. It further provides that in any action upon such marketing
agreement it shall be conclusively presumed that a landowner as landlord or lessor is able to control the delivery of products produced on
his land by tenants or others whose tenancy or possession or work on
such land, or the term of whose tenancy or possession or labor thereon,
were created or change after execution by the landowner or landlord or
lessor of such a marketing agreement. It was within the power of the
legislature to provide a rule of conclusive presumption on the question
of the landlord's power to control the delivery of the products and as a
conclusive presumption can not be overcome by contrary proof, the
effect of the provision is to put it out of the power of either the landlord or the tenant to plead or prove any fact tending to show that the
landlord did not have such control."
This is the leading case in Kentucky on the point. It was decided
January 19, 1924, and undoubtedly represents the law on the point in
this state. We may well expect the courts to follow it in all later cases
based on the particular section of the Bingham Act which it construes.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reached an opposite result
in the case of Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Association v. Bissett, 187
N. C. 180, 121 S. E. 446. The action in this case was based on a contract
substantially the same in it provisions as the contract in the Kentucky
case cited supra and in the principal case. But an opposite conclusion
was reached in construing the North Carolina statute, chapter 87, laws,
1921. The North Carolina Court said in part: "It is signifificant that,
though the act on its face has been carefully and skillfully drawn, it is
nowhere stated in it that the landlord shall be compelled to deliver all
tobacco produced upon his lands by non-member tenants. Such provision was made in the Kentucky statute and is the basis upon which
was decided the case in the circuit court of Mc~racken County of Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Association v. Feagain, decided January
19, 1924, and which is cited by plaintiff."
Thus we have two cases, one in Kentucky and one in North Carolina, that reach opposite results although based on practically the same
agreement. The difference in the cases is attributable to the particular
statute in each case. The Bingham Act is more skillfully drawn than
the Marketing Act of North Carolina. This accounts for the difference
in the result reached in the two cases.
W. D. S.
ARREsr-CnnuAL LAW-AREST l1EL
VALID, AND DEP=nANT's
POSSESSION OF LIQUOR DiscovEREi) BEOrau ARREST ro Bn&oH or PrAcn

CASE COMMENTS
WITHOUT WARRANT AND WITHOUT SEARCH OF PERSON, HELD COMPETENT,
A&sOFFENSE M&Y RE DEEMED As iN Om cER's PRnESEc&-A warrant of
arrest charging A with breach of peace was issued and given to policeman M. Policeman Y, who was under orders to arrest A upon sight,
arrested him without the warrant. A bottle of whiskey was discovered
by policeman Y in A's pocket before the arrest and without search of
his person. On the hearing before the court the warrant charging A
with breach of peace was filed away and he was held on the charge of
unlawfully having in possession intoxicating liquors, as a second
offense, which was made a felony under the statute. Held, A's possession of liquor, discovered before his arrest for breach of peace without
a warrant, was competent evidence on the charge of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor, as the offense might be deemed to be in
officer's presence, and the subsequent arrest was authorized. Scott v.
Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 766, 286 S. W. 1038.
The weight of authority takes the view in the case of arrest without warrant, that is expressed in Cabell v. Arnold, 86 Texas 102, 23 S.
W. 645, as follows: "A warrant in the hands of a marshall or sheriff
will not justify a deputy who does not have possession of it, in making
an arrest, where the statute requires the warrant to be exhibited on
request to the person arrested." It was held in Town of Blacksburg v.
Beam, 104 S. C. 196, 88 S. E. 441, "A citizen may not be arrested and
have his person searched without process to secure evidence against
him." However, this position is dispensed with in the present case by
the committing of a felony in the officer's presence, proceeding the
arrest. The Kentucky courts, following the general rule, hold that
officers are justified in arresting without a warrant in cases of felony
and breach of peace. Tilman v. Beard, 121 Mich. 475, 80 N. W. 248;
Stevens v. Com., -, 124 Ky. 32, 98 S. W. 284. Following the arrest,
according to Ex Parte Hum, 92 Ala. 102, 9 South. 515, "An officer may
search a prisoner, and remove from him anything connected with the
offense, and which may be used as evidence against him." This statement seems to be the general rule.
In State v. Sutter, 71 W. Va. 371, 76 S. E. 811, it was held, "That a
bottle of cocaine was obtained from the accused by an officer, who, when
he saw the accused in the act of selling the same, rushed into his presence with a pistol, and searched him, and found on his person the bottle
of cocaine, does not render the bottle of cocaine inadmissible in evidence on the ground .that it was obtained by unlawful search of the
person." This case also laid down the following principle: "An arresting officer may search the prisoner and remove from his person, for
evidence, articles found." This appears to be the weight of authority,
and is firm support for the decision in he ca.-, in aaestion. Here, the
committing of the felony in the officer's presence validatea the urrest,
and the arrest authorized the removal of the whiskey and its introduction as evidence. The principles governing the decision herein are
well established in statutory law and in the law of the land.
E. C. M.

234
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AUTOmORIL--DEFENDANT

BLINDED BY

APPROACHING

LIGHT,

WAS

UNDER DUTY TO SLACKEN SPEED OF AUTOMOBILE AND GIVE WARNING (Ky.
STATS., SEC. 2739G-47)-WHERE DEFENDANT IIEETING Two OTHER CARS
WAS BLINDED BY THEm LIGHTS HE WAS UNDER DUTY TO SLACKEN SPEED
OF CAR AND GIvE WARNING OF APPROACH UNDER KY. STATS., SEC 2739a-47,.

-As A was crossing the street at an intersection he was struck and
killed by C's automobile. Just about the time of the accident C met
two cars, and he says he was blinded by the lights of these machines
and did not see A until it was too late to avoid hitting him. The evidence did not show any negligence on the part of A. A's wife brought
an action to recover for his death. Held, under such conditions C
should have slackened his speed and given warning of 'his car's
approach. Having failed to do so, in the absence of proof that A was
negligent C must be held liable. Downing v. Baucom's Adm'r, 216 Ky.
108, 287 S. W. 362.
Section 2937g-47 Ky. Stats., provides: "Every operator of an automobile or bicycle, when approaching a curve or an obstruction to the
view on a public highway which prevents a clear view for a distance
ahead of one hundred and fifty feet, shall hold said automobile or
bicycle under control and shall give warning by horn or other sound
device of his approach." Applying section No. 2739g, Ky. Stats., the
court in National Casket Co. v. Powar, 137 Ky. 156, 125 S. W. 279, said,
it "is declaratory of the common law of negligence, adding certain
specific standards for motor vehicles on highways. A violation thereof
is negligence per se.
. .
The provision in regard to control at
intersecting roads is for the benefilt of anyone who may be there."
The doctrine that the violation of such statutes is negligence per se
is adhered to in Schell v. Du Bois, 14 Ohio St. 93, 113 N. E. 664, and in
decisions in many other states. It was decided in Campbell v. St. Louis
Transit Co., 121 Mo. App. 406, 99 S. W. 58, a failure to observe the rules
as laid down for the governing of oneself and vehicle upon public highways is of itself negligent. Nookes v. New York Cent., etc., R. Co., 121
N. Y. App. Div. 716, 106 N. Y. Suppl. 552.
The court in Barnes d-Bros. v. Bastin, 190 Ky. 392, 227, S. W. 578,
laid down the rule that a driver of a motor car who runs into a cloud of
dust so dense he cannot see the road or other vehicles approaching
should bring his car to a standstill and sound a warning notifying persons of his presence; and if he continues to speed ahead he is guilty of
gross negligence. The result of this case is also reached in Budnick v.
Peterson. 25 Mich. 678, 184 N. W. 493, in the following terms: "If his
(automobilist's) vision was obscured by the glaring lights of the approaching car, it was his duty to slacken his speed and have his car
under such control that he might stop it immediately, if necessary." The
same conclusion was reached in Jacquith v. Warden, 73 Wash. 349, 132
P. 33, in which case it was held that it was negligence for the driver
of an automobile to continue driving along the streets when he was so
blinded by a street car head-light that he could not see ahead of him.
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There it was reasoned, "he was required to anticipate that others might
be using the street."
However, it was decided in Cumberland TeL & Tel. Co. v. Yeiser,
141 Ky. 15, 131 S. W. 1049, that a failure to give -the statutory warning
will not warrant a recovery in damages from an injury to which that
failure did not in any way contribute.
In this case, -the defendant failing in the duty to slacken the speed
of his car and give warning was guilty of gross negligence and was
consequently held liable. In view of the increasing traffic the reasons
underlying the Kentucky Statute and its present application are sound.

E.C. M.
CHAMPERTY AND IlAINTENANcE-RECONVEYANCE TO CARRY OuT RECIS.
SION OF CHAMPERTOUS DEED is

VALID roa THAT PURPOSE, THOUGH MADE

WnIau LAND is HELD ADvusAnY.-The appellees brought this action to
quiet title to a tract of land in Perry county. They had conveyed the
land, while it was in the adverse possession of the appellants. However, when the appellees' grantees discovered that the land was adversely held, they by written agreement, before this action was brought,
rescinded their contract with the appellees, and reconveyed the land to
the appellees.
The court held that since the law in Kentucky requires the chainpertous contract to be rescinded before the grantor can maintain an
action for the possession, a reconveyance to carry out -the contract of
rescission though made while the land was adversely held by another,
must be regarded valid for that purpose. Holliday, et al. v. Tennis Coal
Co., et al., 215 Ky. 551; 286 S. W. 773.
Section 210 of the Kentucky Statutes provides, "All sales, or conveyances, including those made under execution, of any lands, or the
pretended right or title to same, of which any other person, at the time
of such sale, has adverse possession, shall be null and void." The
grantee takes nothing under such a conveyance. However, section 212
of the Kentucky Statutes gives the party in possession, his heirs, and
assigns a right to set up the champertous contract in an action by the
grantor for the possession. The statute was passed for the protection
of the possession, and unless the contract between the grantor and
grantee is rescinded before the action is brought the paper title is considered as being in the grantee, and the plaintiff can not disturb the
party in adverse possession by showing title in a third person. C7:owlew v. Vaughan, 11 Bush 517; Harman v. Brewster, 7 Bush 355; Luen
v. Wilson, 85 Ky. 503, 3 S. W. 911; Hobson v. Henarick, 7 K. L. R. 362;
and Doyle v. Cornett, 187 Ky. 586; 219 S. W. 1059.
In Luen v. Wilson, supra, the court said, "The law of champerty was
intended as a shield to the possession and not as a weapon of offense,
as a defense to the remedy sought by a plaintiff, and a grantor after
he has conveyed land adversely held cannot, without first rescinding
or abandoning the contract in good faith, be heard to say that it was
champertous, and it cannot therefore affect him." That case was under
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an older statute, but the same reasoning has been adopted in feade v.
Ratliff, 133 Ky. 411, 118 S. W. 271, a case decided under the present
statute.
It naturally follows that if the law requires the parties to a chainpertous contract, concerning land in adverse possession, to rescind the
contract and place themselves in status quo, before an action can be
maintained by the grantor for the possession, it would be inconsistent
to hold reasonable means to bring about the requirements of law
invalid. If the law requires the parties to rescind, it would be against
all justice to hold that the steps toward rescission are void. It seems
that from principle the holding of the court in the principal case must
be considered well decided.
3. S. F.
CRIMNAL LAW-A PETr JURY is NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE A FOREmA,
AND WHETHER ITS MEMBER WHO SIGNED THE VERDICT DESIGNATED HimtSELF AS FoREArAN on NOT IS ImmATERAL.In a prosecution for grand

larceny a member of -the jury signed the verdict, designating himself
as "one of the jury," and it did not appear that the jury had a foreman. It was contended for the defendant that it was necessary to the
validity of the verdict that there should have been a foreman, and that
the verdict should have been signed by the foreman. Held, that a
petit jury is not required to have a foreman, and that whether or not
its member who signed the verdict designated himself as foreman
makes no difference. Grump v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 827, 287 S. W.
23.
Carroll's Kentucky Criminal Code, sixth edition, section 255, provides that . . . "their foreman must declare their verdict." But
it was decided in the case of Thomas v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. L. Rep.
903, 15 S. W. 861, that failure of a member of the jury, who signs the
verdict, to designate himself foreman Is immaterial. The same rule
prevails in civil cases. It has been held that section 324, 325, Carroll's
Kentucky Civil Code, sixth edition, which requires the verdict to be
read by the foreman, are merely directory, and are no ground for
reversal unless it clearly appears that the party complaining has been
injured by the omission. Berry v. Pusey, 80 Ky. 166, 3 Ky. L. Rep. 656.
There are very few cases in the books on this point, but the prIncipal dase is in accord with the universal holding. Bryan v. state, 260
S. W. 846 (Tex. Cr. App.).
B. D.
DESCENT AND DISTRIUTION-ADvANcEzIENTS OPERATE ONLY ON UNDEVISED PROPERTY AND AlE INEFFECTIVE WHERE ENTIRE ESTATE HAS BEEN
MENTION OF Tmr.-Prior to 1880 testator executed four several deeds of conveyance to certain of his daughters. In
each conveyance the transaction was referred to as an advancement.
No other consideration was paid. The value of the property was fixed
in each deed. Later, testator advanced to his son $900.00 In cash. In
1900 testator died. By the terms of his will he gave his entire estate
to his widow for life, remainder to their children or their childrens'
DEVISED WITHOUT ANY
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survivors, except his son to whom testator gave a legacy of five dollars
with the explanation that this was all testator wanted him to have.
No mention was made of the advancements. The lower court adjudged
an equalization and held that there was a lien on each tract to the
extent that the value fixed in the deed exceeded the owner's distributable share in -the estate and ordered that enough of the land be sold to
satisfy the liens. Held, the doctrine of advancements applies only to
undevised estates. McPherson, et ux. v. Black, et a?., 215 Ky. 92, 284
S. W. 413.
In the principal case the conveyances were made prior'to 1880 and
were specifically denominated as advancements in the instruments of
transfer. No other consideration was paid. The only thing that
defeats them is a lack of property upon which to operate as advancements. Green v. Hathaway, 36 N. J. Eq. 471, 52 Ohio St. 470, 40 N. E.
165; Jones v. Jones, 6 N. C. 150; West v. Beck, 95 Ia. 520, 64 N. W. 599;
Nichols v. King, 24 K. L. R. 124, 68 S. W. 133. But in determining the
specific property upon which advancements can operate the courts are
continually confronted by the rule that the doctrine of advancements
applies only to intestate property. Owsley v. Owsley, 25 K. L. R. 1194;
In re Lear, 146 Mo. App. 624, 124 S. W. 592; Biedler v. Biedler, 87 Va.
300, 12 S. E. 753.
In most states the doctrine of advancements applies only in the
case of persons dying wholly intestate and is not applicable in the case
of partial intestacy. Hall v. Hall, 137 Ia. 4, 110 N. W. 148; Trammel
v. Trammel, 148 Ind. 487, 47 N. E. 925; McNeil v. Hammond, 87 Ga. 618,
13 S. E. 640; Gratton v. Gratton, 18 Ill. 167, 65 Ami. Dec. 726; Brown v.
Kent, 190 N. Y. 422, 83 N. E. 472; Jenkins v. Mitchell, 57 N. C. 207;
Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432, 70 Am. Dec. 85; Waldron v. Taylor,
52 W. Va. 284, 45 S. E. 336.
This rule is also applicable where a will is inoperative or invalid
or ineffective for any other reason at the time of testator's death, as
well as where he never made a will at all. Hartwell v. Rice, I Gray
(Mass.) 587;Douglas v. Rice, 25 S. C. Eq. 322.
However, in a few states it has been expressly provided by statute
that the doctrine of advancements shall apply in the case of partial
intestacy as well as in the case of absolute intestacy. Tennessee, Virginia and Kentucky have this statutory provision. Perry v. High, 3
Head (Tenn.) 349; Gold v. Vaughan, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 245; Farnsworth
v. Dinsmore, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 38; Pearce v. Gleaves, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.)
359; Sturdevant v. Goodrich, 3 Yerg (Tenn.) 95; Vance v. Huling, 2
Yerg. (Tenn.) 135; Biedler v. Biedler, 87 Va. 300, 12 S. B. 753; Bawles
v. Winchester, 13 Bush (Ky.) 1; Clarkson v. Clarkson, 8 Bush (Ky.)
655. But this rule is applicable only to the extent of the undisposed
part of the testator's estate and not to any part thereof that has been
effectually disposed of by his will. Cole v. Pdlmer, 1 Bush (Ky.) 371.
It is clear that the ruling of the lower court in the principal case
does not come within any rule of law applicable to advancements or
within any exception thereto. Therefore, the upper court, in reversing
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the lower court, followed the settled rule in this and other states in
holding that the doctrine of advancements is applIcable only to intestate
property.
W. D. S.
DIVOnCE-WIFE OF INSANE HUSBAND MAY SUE FoR DIVORCE, ALLEGINo

CRUEL AND INHumAN TREATMENT PRE0viUs TO THE HUSBAND'S

CONFINE.

MrNT IN THE AsyLUM.-The plaintiff filed a petition asking for a divorce
from the defendant, her husband. The suit was filed after the defendant
had been adjudged a lunatic and committed to the asylum. She alleged
cruel and inhuman treatment previous to defendant's confinement in
the asylum. Held, that the wife of an insane husband may sue for
divorce, showing cruel and inhuman treatment prior to husband's confinement in the asylum. King v. King, 214 Ky. 171, 283 S. W. 73.
Huston v. Huston, 150 Ky. 353, 150 S. W. 386, it was decided that a
divorce may be obtained for acts accruing prior to the insanity and
that the mere subsequent insanity of the defendant will not defeat the
husband's right to a divorce. In the case of Jordan v. Jordan, 257 S.
W. 569, Tex. Civ. Ap. 1923, the court was of the opinion that an action
for divorce may be obtained against an insane defendant, represented
by guardian ad litem, where the acts constituting the grounds for the
divorce were committed by such defendant prior to becoming insane.
It was held in Gain v. Miller, 185 N. W. 478 (Iowa), that where a cause
of action for divorce on the ground of cruelty was complete prior to
wife's insanity, a divorce might be granted the husband, notwithstanding, the wife's insanity.
In the case of Lewis v. Lewis, 60 0kla. 60, 158 Pac. 368, the defense
was that an action for divorce could not be maintained, on account of
defendant's insanity. The acts complained of, however, were committed before defendant's insanity. The court there said that an action
for divorce, or alimony alone for any of the causes for which divorce
may be granted may be maintained against an insane person, represented by guardian, where it appears that the acts constituting the
ground of divorce were committed by such defendant, prior to his
becoming insane.
Section 2120, Kentucky Statutes, provides: "An action for divorce
must be brought within five years next after the doing of the act
complained of." Section 423, subsection 3, of the Civil Code provides:
"That plaintiff to obtain a divorce, must allege and prove, in addition
to a legal cause of divorce, that the cause of divorce accrued or existed
within five years next before the commencement of the action."
In 2 Bishop on "Marriage, Divorce and Separation," section 518
the author says that "divorce being a civil proceeding, there can be no
just ground for excepting it, for it has always been the practice in
the civil department of the law to maintain suits against insane parties
the same as against sane ones. To deny the law's justice to the sane
one because of the other's insanity would be to cast in part on the
former the burden which God had laid wholly on the latter." His or
her subsequent insanity is not, under the modern law regarded a bar
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to such proceeding. This is on the reasoning that an action for divorce
or separation is a civil action, and not a criminal suit, a proceeding
which cannot be instituted or carried on while the accused is a lunatic.
The conflict on this point is confined, practically, to a few earlier
English cases, which, have since been either reversed or overruled. 83
Am. Dec. 200, 19 Am. Rep. 371, 34 L. R. A. 166. An action for divorce
should not, however, be tried against one whose reason has been
dethroned and who is thus rendered incapable of making answer to a
charge or aiding counsel in the conduct of his or her defense, until at
least a reasonable time is allowed for recovery and restoration to
dapacity. The fact that insanity may preclude an effectual defense in
an action for a divorce or separation must be regarded as a misfortune
resulting from the respondent's condition, and not as affecting the
petitioner's right to sue.
By reason of the foregoing authorities it seems to be a well established rule that a proceeding for divorce or separation may be instituted
against an insane spouse for a cause of divorce accruing while he or
M.W. M.
she was sane.
]JEcTmENT--EVIDENcE OF SPECIAL MASTERS DEED HELD NOT TO TRACE
TITLE TO LAND SOUGHT TO BE RECOVERED IN EJECTMENT TO COMMON

SOURCE OR TO RELIEV PLAINTIFF OF THE NECESSITY OF TRACING TITLE TO
T rE CommoNWEALTH.-An ejectment action was brought by appellee
against appellant. Appellant asked for peremptory instructions in his
favor because appellee had failed to trace title to the commonwealth.
Appellee admitted this but insisted that both he and appellant traced
their respective titles to a common source. The trial court refused to
give peremptory instructions in favor of the apellant and this refusal
is one of the grounds of the appeal. Held: that had the proof in the
case shown that appellee and appellant acquired their respective titles
from a common source, then appellee would have been relieved of the
necessity of tracing title to the commonwealth; but that inasmuch as
the proof did not show that the alleged common source of title ever
owned, or even if it did own, ever became divested of the title now
claimed by appellee, the appellee must trace title to the commonwealth. Ellis v. Sparks, 215 Ky. 316, 285 S. W. 199.
The great weight of authority, both of the Kentucky court and of
courts generally, is that a plaintiff in ejectment will be relieved of the
necessity of tracing title to the commonwealth, provided he alleges,
and if it is denied, proves, that both he and defendant in ejectment
derive their respective titles from a common source. Turner v. Liebel,
185 Ky. 313, 215 S. W. 70; Branstetterv. McGuire, 194 Ky. 720;, 240 S.
W. 354; Collins v. Zella Mining Co., 198 Ky. 770, 250 S. W. 96; Pineland
Club v. Roberts, 130 C. C. A. 125, 213 F. 545; Rogers v. Vanderburg, 168
Mo. 430, 68 S. W. 340. Of course, plaintiff in ejectment must show a
better title than that of defendant, even where title is derived from a
common source; but such better title need not be traced to the commonwealth. Harrisonv. Gallegos, 79 P. 300.
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With such a rule clearly laid down it is evident that the decision
of the court in the instant case concerned chiefly the sufficiency of the
evidence introduced by the appellee to establish his contention that
his source of title was common to that of the appellant. The efficacy
of a decision under such circumstances depends very largely upon the
discretion and judgment displayed by the court in weighing the peculiar
facts of the individual case with certain well defined standards as the
scale. In such a case if the proper standards are selected by the court
we may well expect a consistent ruling. The rule most apt here, and
the one evidently in the mind of the court, is that when a plaintiff in
ejectment claims title from a common source and the defendant denies
such common source, the effect of such denial is to leave on the plaintiff the burden of proof. Collin v. Zella Mining 198 Ky. 770, 250 S. W.
96; Hunn v. Stiffney, 189 Ky. 255, 224 S. W. 849;Scholfield v. City of
Tulsa, 111 Okla. 220, 239 P. 236. Of course this is consistent with the
whole theory of the burden of proof in ejectment. Payne v. Dhfwards,
188 Ky. 302, 221 S. W. 1073; Zettle v. Simpson, 204 Ky. 470, 264 S. W.
G. R.
1092.
ESTorPmP-AFTEn AcQUnIED TITLE To CEMuaH PHOPEMTY NOT AIuETIONED on RESERVED ix DEED, ImmEDIATELY PAssEs To PUicHAsEn OF LAW.
-The ancestor of the assignors of the plaintiff sold and conveyed to
the assignor of the defendant by general warranty deed a tract of land
which included in its bounds the property claimed by the plaintiff.
Before this grant was made the grantor had conveyed the lands in
dispute to certain parties, their heirs and assigns, so long as the lands
should be used for church purposes; then to revert to the grantor. The
land ceased to be used for church purposes, and the plaintiff claimed
as grantee of the heirs of the original grantor. The defendant contended that the original grantor, or his heirs and assigns, were estopped
from setting up the lack of title in the original grantor at the time of
his conveyance to the assignor of the defendant. Held, that any title
acquired by the vendor or his heirs after the conveyance to the defendant's assignors passed immediately to the defendant, or his assignors then in possession, by way of estoppel. Crider v. KentiniaCorton Corporation,214 Ky. 353, 283 S. W. 117.
Where a vendor, having no title, a defective title, or an estate less
than that which he assumed to grant, conveys with warranty or covenants of like import, and subsequently acquires the title or estate which
he porported to convey, or perfects his title, the universal rule is that
such after acquired or perfected title inures to the grantee or his assigns, by way of 'estoppel. Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U. S. 546, 36 L. Ed.
813; Doe v. Oliver, 10 B. & C. 181, 109 Reprint 418; Weir v. Weir, 138
Ky. 788, 129 S. W. 108. The reason for the rule Is that it would b
unjust to permit one, after he had asserted ownership, and made a deed
conveying it to another, to obtain by deed or otherwise an outstanding
title and hold it against his grantee. War Fork Land Co. v. Marcum,
182 Ky. 352, 202 S. W. 668.
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There are certain exceptions to the rule. The rule applies, "only
where there is an effort to convey a present interest and title to specific
property, and to vest the vendee with such present interest; ad it
does not apply in cases . . . where the thing attempted to be conveyed is a mere expectancy only." Burton v. Campbell, 176 Ky. 495,
195 S. W. 1091. Accordingly it does not apply in the case of an heir
making a conveyance of an estate which he expects to inherit from an
owner then living, since the thing attempted to be conveyed has no
potential existence, and is a fraud upon the owner and against public
policy, Spacey v. Close, 184 Ky. 523, 212 S. W. 127. It has been held that
this is no exception. Prichardv. Fox, 154 S. W. 105 (Tex.), where the
grantor conveys land held adversely by another, and later acquires title,
he is not estopped, for Kentucky Statutes, sections 210, 216, state that
conveyances of land held adversely by another are null and void.
Artemus v. Nickell, 115 Ky. 506, 74 S. W. 221. The rule does not depend
upon how the title was subsequently acquired. Gardner v. Gardner,
117 Miss. 694, 78 So. 623, except that the rule has no application where
the property was afterwards acquired by adverse possession. Jones
v. Miller, 3 Fed. 384, 1 McCrary 535. The rule does not apply in case
of a quit-claim deed, except where the grantor has only the equitable
title, and subsequently acquires the legal title. Johnson v. Johnson,
173 Ky. 701, 191 S. W. 672. The principal case clearly does not fall
within any of these exceptions, and is in accord with the general rule.
Whether title vested in the original grantor upon the holder's ceasing
to use it for church purposes, or whether an entry was necessary, presents a more serious question. In keeping with some American cases
the court assumed that the title reverted to the grantor in such a case.
B. D.
Mott v. Danville Seminary, et al., 129 Ill. 403, 21 N. E. 927.
ExPLOSIVEs-GENERALLY ONE LEAvInG EXPLOSIVE EXPOSED AND UNGUARDED ON HIS PREMfISES IS LIABLE FOR INJURIES TO TRESPASSING CHMDREN TnEREFrsom.-On A's premises were stored in a two-room building
steel drums containing gasoline and a container holding about twelve
pounds of powder. The powder was kept on a shelf seven feet from
the floor. The rules of A, a manufacturing company, forbade children
to play there, and the servants of A sought to enforce the rules. B, a
child eight years old, who had frequently been warned to keep off the
grounds, entered the building and filled his pockets with the powder.
While he and other children were throwing powder in a fire, the powder
in his pocket was ignited and caused his death. Held, A had not left
the explosive "exposed and unguarded" so as to come within the general rule that "a person leaving exposed and unguarded on his premises
an explosive which is found by trespassing children is liable for any
injuries resulting from its explosion." Eastern Carbon Black Co. v.

Stephen's Admr, 216 Ky. 85, 287 S.W. 215.
The court followed the general rule laid down in Stephens v.
Stephens, 172 Ky. 780, 189 S. W. 1143. It is amply supported by decisions of the Kentucky courts and those of other states. Miller v. Chand-
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ler, 168, Ky., 606, 182 S. W. 833. The following statement is made in
Mattson v. Minn. & N. W. B. Co,., 95 Minn. 477, 104 N. W. 443: "The
degree of care required of persons having control of dangerous explosives, to prevent harm to others, is greater and more exacting as respects young children." Treating of cases within the general rule
governing the duty of a person to use care in dealing with explosives,
the court in Bal v. Midlesboro Town & Lands Co., 24 Ky. L. R. 114,
68 S. W. 6, said: "The ground of liability in this class of cases is that
the defendant failed to exercise such care as might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence under the circumstances."
But there must have been negligence or a failure to use such care
to give cause of action for damages. "Negligence in the keeping of
gunpowder or in the manner of its ,keeping is requisite to impose a
liability for damages resulting to another by an accidental explosion
or fire." Kenny.v. Koopmann, 116 Ala. 310, 22 So. 593. In the light of
this case and Jacobs v. New York, N. H. d H. B. Oi, 212 1AVss. 96, 98
N. E. 688, the court herein reached a proper conclusion. In the latter
case it was decided that a railroad company is not liable for the death
of a boy, whose companion, while with him at the station, had picked
up a torpedo carelessly dropped from a train, and later with his assistance exploded it, with a fatal result to him, since it was not bound to
anticipate such a result of its carelessness.
In the present case no actionable negligence was found. It appeared to the court that there was no sufficient reason to anticipate any
meddling with the gunpowder in the place where it was stored. The
present holding finds further support in the cases of Louisville, etc., Ry.
Co. v. Hurt, 24 Ky. 1123, 70 S. W. 830; Kidder v. gadler, 117 Maine 194,
103 A. 159, in which lies the following principle: "No liabilities arise
for injuries to children where the explosives have been guarded with
reasonable care, or left where there was no reason to anticipate meddling."
E. C. M.
G.wiG---CNDUCTING DOG RACES WITHIN INCLOSED TRACK AND PERMITTING WAGERS AND CONDUCTING POOLS THEREIN ABATABLE AS A NUIS.
ANCE IN VIEW OF STATUTEs.-The appellants rented certain premises

which in former years had been used as a fair ground and a race
course. The grounds were abandoned for that purpose and the race
track within it is which was no longer used for horse races. At the
beginning of the lease the appellants constructed thereon a circular
track, equipped with an apparatus by means of which an "electrical
hare" could be run on a single rail in the center of the track so as to
cause dogs to chase it. Great crowds assembled to witness the races
and the appellant sold pools on the races, charging for each ticket from
two to ten dollars. When the race was over, the owners of the tickets
on the dog winning the race divided the entire amount of money so bet,
less the commission charged by the appellant. Warrants were issued
and the appellants executed bonds to appear in court but did not desist
from conducting the races. Appellee then filed their bill in equity alleg-
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Ing the foregoing facts and prayed an injunction restraining the continuation of such practice. Held, the appellants were engaged in unlawful conduct which might be prevented by the injunctive remedy
sought by the appellee. ErlangerKennel Club, et al. v. Daugherty, Attorney General, et aL, 213 Ky. 648, 281 S. W. 826.
Upon appeal the appellants' contention was that they do not come
within any of the provisions of Kentucky Stats., sections 1328a, 1960,
1961, 3914b-1, 3914b-6, 3990a-1, 3990a-4, since they run the races herein
described on a regular race track organized for that purpose and are
thereby excluded from the provision of section 1960 by the exemption
contained in sec. 1961. The court declared that such reasoning, however, is specious illogical and entirely utnconvincing. "Dog tracing,
such as here involved, was an unknown thing beyond fifteen or twenty
years ago, since the electrical apparatus by which the dogs could be
induced to run was not invented until that time. Therefore at the
time of the enactment of sections 1960 and 1961 the legislature could
not have had in mind dog racing as one of the things excluded from
the operation of the latter section wherein regular races were run on
inclosed tracks." The court further said, "A well known rule for the
interpretation of statutes is that the terms employed may be given
meaning and application in light of the circumstances and conditions
existing at the time of their enactment and the purpose the legislature
had in view in enacting then."
The court in the case of Bailey v. Commonwealth, 74 Ky. (11 Bush)
691, after recognizing the rule of construction that words in a statute
are to be taken according to the approved meaning of language, said,
"But there are other rules of construction of equal dignity and importance which must not be overlooked, and which though not incorporated
in our statute are as binding upon the court as if embodied in it. One
of these rules is that every statute ought to be expounded not according to the letter but according to the meaning, and another, that every
interpretation that leads to an absurdity ought to be rejected,' and
still another, that a law 'ought to be interpreted in such a manner as
that it may have effect and not be found vain and illusive.'"
The rule of construction followed by the principle case falls directly
In line with the rule applied by the court when Ky. St. sees. 1960 and
1961 were before it for the first time. The court upon that occasion
said, "An act of the legislature like any other instrument must be construed so as to carry into effect the intention of the makers. The exception in the statute in favor of combination or French pools sold on any
race track during the races thereon was not in the previous statutes,
and we must presume that the legislature had some purpose in inserting this exception in the present act. Under the former constitution
special legislation was allowed. The different racing associations
operated under special charters which conferred upon them privilege
more or less broad. When the new constitution came into effect and
special legislation was pro'hibited, it was perceived by the legislature
that some general provision must be made if -these special privileges

KENTUcxY LAW JouaNAL
which these racing associations then enjoyed were to continue. The
raising of horses had been a favored industry in a large part of the
state and much capital was invested in it. The legislature evidently
had in mind granting a privilege to .the regular race tracks during the
races thereon." Grinstead, et al. v. Kirby, Judge, 110 S. W. 247 (Ky).
By the court's construction of Ky. St., Secs. 1960 and 1961 the
appellants contention is meaningless. The rule of construction here
adopted has long been established in many jurisdictions. Wilkinson
v. Leland, 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 627, 7 L. Ed. 542; United States v. Buchanan,
9 Fed. 689; Perry County v. Jefferson County, 94 Ill. 214; Wabash, St.
L. & P. By. Co..v. Burket, 106 Ill. 298; Inhabitants of Somerset v. Inhabitants of Dighton, 12 Mass. 383; Sargent v. Union School District
in Concord, 63 N. H. 528, 2 Atl. 641; Brown v. Wright, 13 N. J. Law
240; People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 358, 8 Am. Dec. 243;
Crocker v. Crane, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 211, 34 Am. Dec. 228; Smith v.
People, 47 N. Y. 330.
C. P. R.
HIOMICIDE--IN HOMICIDE CASE, INSTRUCTION TO FIND BOTHEE DEFEND-

on ABETTED THE AcTuAL KIrLING
HELD ERRONEOUS-EACH DEFENDANT'S GUILT On INNOCENCE BEING DEPENDANT ONLY ON HIS OWN PARTICIPATION.-A and B were indicted toANTS GUILTY IF EITHER OF THam AIDED

gether with C for the murder of D. On the trial the court directed that
if the jury should believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
"that D was unlawfully, etc., . . . shot and killed by C, A or B,
when it was not necessary, etc. . . . and that defendants A and B
were present at the time and did unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously
aid, abet, advise, counsel or encourage C or the one of them who did
said killing, they should find A and B guilty, etc. . . . " Held:
That under the facts of the case this instruction was clearly erroneous
and prejudicial, as each defendant's guilt or innocence Is dependent
only on his own participation. Barnett v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 786,
287 S. W. 12.
An instruction is erroneous which authorizes the jury to convict a
defendant because of his presence or because of his mere mental approval or consent, without requiring that he shall have aided in or
encouraged the commission of the crime. True v. Commonwealth, 90
Ky. 651, 14 S. W. 684; Plummer v. Commonwealth, 1 Bush (Ky.) 76;
Chapman v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. App. 328, 65 S. W. 1098; Faulkner v.
State, 43 Tex. Cr. App. 311, 65 S. W. 1093. An instruction is erroneous
which ignores or tends to exclude some material element or some material part of the evidence. Collins v. Commonwealth, 192 Ky. 412, 233
S. W. 896 ; State v. iNargashian,26 R. I. 299, 58 Atl. 953, 106 Am. S. IL
715. An instruction ad to the law of principles and accessories must
be applicable to and supported by the issues and evidence in the case.
Early v. Commonwealth, 24 Ky. L. 1181, 70 S. W. 1061.
The instruction in the principal case expressly directed the jury
to find both-appellants guilty if either of them aided or abetted C to
kill D under such circumstances as would require the homicide to be
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found to be either murder or manslaughter. In Bullivan v. State, 85
!Miss. 149, 37 So. 1006, the court said, "the instruction did not correctly
state the law as it permitted the conviction of each for the act of the
other, when in fact defendant was not guilty if there was no preconcerted plan between hfih and his son to commit any unlawful act whatsoever against deceased."
It is evident that the trial court in the instant case was attempting to give a conspiracy Instruction, which was clearly unwarranted by
the evidence. The Court of Appeals after a careful analysis of the
facts found such to be the case. Where evidence does not show a conspiracy such an instruction is not proper. Lockard v. Commonwealth,
193 Ky. 619, 237 S. W. 26. The instruction slApuld have been worded
so as not to be misleading and so as to make the jury clearly understand that the guilt or innocence of each is dependent upon his own
participation in the homicide and that neither can be convicted for
what the other did.
The court in rendering its decision has based it primarly upon the
facts of the case. It is clearly correct, both on principles and authority.
R. R. R.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-MORTGAGE OF A MARRIED WOxtAN, THOUGH SUBSCRIBED AND ACKNOWLEDGED BY HUSBAND, IS VOID, WI.E His NAM E DOES

NOT APPEAn IN THE BODY THEREOF, AND HE HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY MADE A
SEPARATE CONvEYANcE (KY. STATS., SEcTION 506).--Plaintiff sold and
conveyed to the defendant a tract of land. No part of the purchase
money was paid in cash, but the defendant and her husband executed
notes, secured by a lien on the land conveyed, and also by a mortgage
on other land owned by the defendant. The mortgage was properly
executed by the defendant and her husbanld but his name did not appear
in the body of the mortgage. The defendant and husband having defaulted in the payment of the notes, the plaintiff brought this suit to
enforce his lien and to reform the mortgage on ground of mistake. It
was mutually agreed between the parties that the notes given for the
purchase price should be secured by a lien on the land and by a mortgage on the other land of the defendant. F or these reasons the chancellor was asked to correct the mistake and make the mortgage conform
to the agreement and intention of the parties. Held, that a court of
equity cannot modify a contract so as to make it legal where it does
not comply with the provisions of the statute. Duncan v. Jenkins, et aL,
215 Ky. 543, 286 S. W. 783.
Section 506, Ky. Stats., provides that "The conveyance may be by
the joint deed of husband and wife, or by separate instrument; but in
the latter case the husband must first convey, or theretofore conveyed.
The deed as to both husband and wife may be acknowledged or proven
and recorded as heretofore, or by this act, provided."
In the case of Simpson v. Smith, 142 Ky. 608, 134 S. W. 1166, the
court in its construction of the statute, held that "A married woman
cannot sell and convey her real estate without her husband joins with
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her and when she attempts to do so in an action by her and her husband to recover it, its possession will be adjudged to her." A conveyance of lands by a married woman during the absence of her husband
in another state was of no effect under the statute requiring the husband to unite in the conveyance, since the antenuptial contract between
the husband and wife did not, clearly authorize a conveyance of the
land by the wife. Brady v. Grady, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 512, 31 S. W. 734.
The rule is applicable to a mortgage as well as a deed. Beverly v.
v. Wailer, 115 Ky. 600, 74 S. W. 264. In the case of Hellard,v. Rockcastle Mining, Lumber and Oil., 153 Ky. 259, 154 S. W. 172, it was held
that a deed made by a married woman in which her husband did not
join, is void although she made it when she and her husband supposed
they had been divorced, no judgment of divorce having been entered.
Although the cases and authorities are few in which the validity
of mortgages is the point in controversy, yet the rule is peculiarly applicable to any contract of a married woman not made in conformity
with statutes enacted for protection of married women, and the majority of the authorities hold that where there is an omission of some
statutory requirement in the deed of a married woman essential to its
validity the mistake cannot be corrected. Jewett v. Davis, 10 Allen
(Mass.) 68; Dickinson v. Glenney, 27 Conn. 104; Grapengetherv. Fejervary, 9 Iowa 163; Lane v. McKeen, 15 Maine 304; 'Purcell v. Goshorn, 17
Ohio 105.
Therefore, as a general rule, the deed of a married woman will not
be reformed by a court of equity to correct matters of substance where
the statutes have not placed them, as regards their conveyances, on the
same footing as a feme sole. Bowden v. Bland, 53 Ark. 53; Snell v.
Snell, 123 Ill. 403; McReynolds v. Grubb, 150 Mo. 352; Carrv. Williams,
10 Ohio 305. Statutes are as binding on courts of equity as on courts
of law, and where a contract is void because not in compliance with
express statutory provisions a court of equity cannot modify it so as to
make it legal and then enforce it. Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U. S.
182; Brazora County v. Youngstown Bridge Co., 80 Fed. 10.
It is to be seen that the court in rendering this dbcision has followed
the rule as clearly set out in the courts of this state as Well as in the
M. W. M.
majority of the courts in other jurisdictions.
PoIaCY
INsvtANOE-NoTE Fo IxsvnANcE PEmiUmS, GilEN W=H
wAs ISSUED, HELD PART OF THE TRANsAcTioN, AND PRovIsIoN THERE
FOR SUSPENSION OF INSURANCE ON FAILURE TO PROBUTLY PAY ANY PRMrOctober, 1922,
IUM INSTALLMENT IS BINDING, THOUGH NOT ix Poo.-In
defendant issued plaintiff a policy of tornado insurance. The premiums
were to be paid in installments and the first installment was paid at
time policy was issued. Each yearly installment was to be paid the
first of November. At time of tornado loss in November, 1925, the
yearly installment due November 1, 1924, had not been paid. The
policy itself contained no provision suspending the Insurance upon
failure to promptly pay the installments; but on the same day a fire
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insurance policy was issued on the same personal property for the same
length of time. An installment note was given by the plaintiff for the
full amount of the premiums payable on both policies. The fire policy
contained a suspension provision and the note contained the same provision. Held: That the note formed a part of the transaction and the
suspension provision for failure to pay any premium installment was
binding though not in the policy. Continental Ins. Co. v. Brown, 216
Ky. 19, 287 S. W. 16.
A provision in a policy of insurance that provides for the suspension of the insurance while any premium note remains due and unpaid
Is reasonable and enforceable. This rule is accepted in most all jurisdictions. Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Custer, 128 Ind. 25, 27 N.
E. 124; National Life Ins. Co. v. Peppond, 100 Tex. 519, 101 S. W. 786;
Crafton v. Home Ins. Co., 199 Ky. 517, 251 S. W. 992. A majority of the
courts are also agreed on the proposition that where the policy and note
given for the premium, both contain a provision for suspension of the
insurance upon non-payment of deferred premium installments, the
failure to pay such note avoids the policy. Houston v. Farmers &
Merchants Ins. Co., 64 Neb. 138, 89 N. W. 635; Continental Ins. Co. v.
Stratton, 185 Ky. 523, 215 S. W. 416; American Ins. Co. v. Hornbarger,
85 Ark. 337, 108, S. W. 213.
The hard case and the one upon which the authorities are in conflict is one such as the instant case, where the suspension provision is
contained in the premium note but not in the policy. Does failure to
pay any premium insfallment when due render the policy void? To
say that it does we must hold the note to be a part of the contract of
insurance. This is the position taken by the Kentucky court in the
case at hand. Under the authority of Continental Ins. Co. v. Harris,
131 Ky. 837, 116 S. W. 256, the Kentucky court seems committed to the
view that such provision in the note alone Is valid. A like rule has
been laid down by other courts. Ressler v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
110 Tenn. 411, 75 S. W. 735; North American Ace. Ins. Co. v. Bowen,
102 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 163; Home Life d Accident Ins. Co. v. Has.
klns, 156 Ark. 77, 245 S. W. 181; French v. Columbia Life & Trust Co.,
80 Or. 412, 156 Pac. 1042; Sexton V. Greensboro Life Ins. Co., 157 N. C.
142, 72 S. E. 863.
The contrary view is expressed by the Georgia court in Arnold v.
Empire Mut. Annuity & Life Ins. Co., 3 Ga. App. 685, 60, 470. The court
held that failure to pay the premium note, would not forfeit the policy,
though it was so stipulated in the note, where there was no suspension
provision in the policy. A similar position has been taken by other
jurisdictions. Coughlin v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., 201 N. W. (Minn.)
920; Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Parker,204 Ala. 313, 85 So. 298.
The conclusion reached by the court in the principal case is logical
and seems In line with the rule as established by the majority of jurisdictions in this country.
R. R. R.
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.UDGmENT-STATE on MUNIcIPALITY iS BOUND BY JuDGM:ENT AGAINST
ADmINIsTRATIV OFFIcERs INVOLVING GENERAL PuRiaO QUEsTIoIN AFFEcTCFMcS,
AND OFICERS ARE BOUND BY JUDGING DELEGATED DUTIESs OF 0
IIENT AGAINST STATE OR MUNICIPAX.ITY INVOLVING SAME QUESTiON.-The

appellee was prosecuting attorney of the city of Ashland at the time the
class of the city was changed from third to second. Before the change
of the class of the city, the appellee brought an action against the city
to recover a thirty per cent commission on all fines, etc., collected under
section 3373 of Carroll's 1922 Edition of Kentucky Statutes, which was
then in force as a part of the charters of cities of the third class. The
city set up section 246 of the State constitution, limiting the salaries
of public officials to $5,000 yearly. The court held that the appellee
was not an officer within the meaning of the constitution, and a verdict was returned for him. The act transferring the class of the city
provided that all officers should hold over until the expiration of their
terms with the same duties and rights; and after the change the appellee brought this action against appellants, proper officers of the city,
to recover a thirty per cent commission on all fines collected, for the
period subsequent to that involved in the first case. As no appeal in
the first case was taken within the period prescribed by law, the judgment remained in full force and effect. The appellants contended that,
although the two cases turned on the question of whether or not the
appellee was an officer within the meaning of the constitution, they
were not bound by the former judgment since they were not parties to
the action, and that the city since it had changed its class was a different city and was not a party to the other suit.
The court held that the city did not lose its identity by the change
of class; that the appellants were bound by the former judgment, no
matter how erroneous, no correction having been made; that a state or
municipality is bound by a judgment against its proper administrative
officers involving a general public question affecting the delegated
duties of such officers, and also that the latter are bound by a judgment against the state or municipality involving the same question.
Carroll, et al.v. FuZlerton, 215 Ky. 558, 286 S. W. 847.
The proposition laid down in the principal case does not arise from
the nature of a municipality, but arises from the nature of our government in all its divisions; state, county, municipality, etc. The ground
upon which a municipality is held bound by a judgment against certain
of its officers is that these are its legal representatives, who are by law
authorized to speak for it and control its affairs. Henderson County
v. Henderson Bridge Company, 116 Ky. 164, 75 S. W. 239; Ashton v.
Rochester, 133 N. Y. 187, 30 N. E. 334.
In ,Stone v. Winn, 165 Ky. 9, 176 S. W. 933, the court said "But the
fiscal court, the county judge, and the county attorney, are the parties
upon whom the law imposed the duty of looking after the business of
the county Kentucky Constitution, section 144: Kentucky Statutes,
sections 1834, 1840, et seq. That the taxpayers of a county are bound
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by a judgment against the county is not only well settled, but would
seem to be such a plain proposition as to need little argument. If a
judgment against a county in its corporate capacity does not bind the
taxpayers composing the county, then it would be difficult to imagine
what efficiency could be given such a judgment."
Kentucky authority on this question can be traced best through the
case of Bank of Kentucky v. Commonwealth, 29 K. L. R. 643, 94 S. W.
620. The defendant banks in what is known as the "Bank Tax Cases,"
97 Ky. 590, 31 S. W. 1013 contended that they had an irrevocable contract and that taxes could only be collected from them under the Hewitt
law; that they were not liable in taxes under the new bank tax law
of 1892, which provided also for a municipal and county tax. The
contention was upheld. Later the court of appeals reversed the decision
of the "Bank Tax Cases" and the appellant company obtained an injunction from a federal court against state, county, and municipal
officers enjoining them from collecting taxes under the new tax act.
The federal court held that the bank company did not have an irrevocable contract but as to them the matter was res adjudicata, no
matter how erroneous the decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
in the first case might be. Bank of Kentucky v. Stone, et al., 88 F.
383, affirmed at 174 U. S. 408.
A very recent case in Louisana has been decided in favor of the
rule stated in the principal case. The court held that judgment from
which no appeal had been taken, ordering a city inspector to issue building permits in the name of a property owner, despite the fact that a
suit to compel issuance of permits was brought by his lessee, was a bar
to an injunction suit by the property owners and the city to restrain
construction of buildings authorized by permits so issued; Robinson v.
Weiner, 105 S. 35, 158 La. 979. But as to cases where an officer sues
for an individual right the rule is different. Where the plaintiff was
mayor and sued to compel a landowner to remove obstructions ffom a
space delineated on a plot of the city as a street, and in such action it
was adjudged that the city had never acquired any easement in the
street shown, such adjudication involving a controversy as to a public
right is no bar to a subsequent action by the plaintiff as an individual,
seeking to enforce a private right in such street. Rahr v. Wittman,
147 Wis. 195, 132 N. W. 1107. For similar cases in other jurisdictions
see: Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 89 N. B.
731; Jonestown v. Ganong, 97 Miss. 67, 52 S. 572; Ransom v. Pierce,101
F. 665, 41 C. C. A. 585; Lyons v. Cooledge, 89 Ill. 529; Millikan v. Lalayette, 118 Ind. 323, 20 N. E. 847; Woodsworth v. Hennessee, 32 Okl.
267, 122 P. 224; Whilddon v. Fletcher,150 Ga. 39, 102 S. E. 350; City of
Palenstine v. City of Houston, 262 S. W. (Texas) 215; Floersheim v.
Board of Commissioners of Harding County, 28 N. M. 330, 212 P. 451;
City of Richmond v. Davies, 135 Va. 319, 116 S. E. 492.
J.S. F.
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LIMTATION OF ACTION-STATUTE OF LIMITATION DOES NOT RUN
AGAINST ANY OF HEms TO WHOM RIGHT OF ENTRY DESCENDS WHO ARE
ALL UNDER DrsABr.TTY AT THAT Tm UNTIL THE DisABILrrY is REMOVED
FnoM ALL.-Appellants and appellees both claim the land of S. who died
intestate in 1897. Appellants are the children and the heirs at law of
H., who was the adopted child of S. and who died in 1895. The appellees are children and grandchildren of S. Upon the death of the widow
of S. in 1901 his land was partitioned among the appellees, his three
children. Deeds were executed for their respective parts and recorded.
The appellees took possession and have remained in open, notorious,
and continuous adverse possession ever since. At the time of this
proceeding for the partition of the land, however, two of the appellants
were infants and one was a married woman. In 1920 the appellants
brought their action for a partition and an accounting for waste, rents,
etc. Held, the appellants right of action was not barred by the Statute of Limitations. Wilcox, et al. v. Sams, et aL, 213 Ky. 696, 281 S.
W. 832.
In construing section 2506 Ky. Stats. which exempts the operation
of the Statutes of Limitations as to those who were under a disability
at the time the right of action accrued, the court said, "The rule has
long been established and consistently followed in this state that, when
the right of entry descends to heirs who are all under a disability at
the time their right of action accrues, the limitation does not begin to
run against any of them until it is removed from all. But if a part of
them are not then under a disability, the disability of the others does
not prevent the statute from running against all. Moore v. Calvert, 6
Bush 356; Henderson v. Fielder,185 Ky. 482; 215 S. W. 187."
May's Heirs v. Bennett, 14 Ky. (4 Bush) 311, was an action in which
the heirs of a prior patentee claimed land against the grantee of a
subsequent patentee. At the time of the death of the plaintiff's predecessor, the first patentee, two of the plaintiffs were feme coverts and
one was an infant. It appeared from the agreed facts that only a part
of the heirs were under a disability at the time of the accrual of the
action. The court held, nevertheless, that the infancy -of only one of
the children of the first patentee was sufficient to prevent the statute
from running and the plaintiffs were entitled to maintain their action.
The reasons for that decision were -founded by analogy upon the
construction of the act of 1796 limiting the time of prosecuting writs
of error. Act of 1796-7, p. 71, see. 13. That act was brought before
the court in a case the plaintiffs in which held an estate as co-heirs and
devisees, cast upon them by act of law. A joint decree was pronounced
against them divesting them of their title. At the time the decree was
pronounced some of the plaintiffs were feme coverts. The court declared that the plaintiffs were bound by the rules of law to prosecute
a joint writ of error for the reversal of that decree and that their
rights were not barred by the statute. The court upon that occasion
said, "It seems to us that the provisions in the act that, 'where a per-
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son thinking himself aggrieved by any decree or judgment, which may
be reversed in the court of appeals, shall be an infant, feme covert, non
compos mentis, or imprisoned when the same was passed, the time of
such disability shall be excluded from the computation of the said five
years,' embraces all those who from the rules of law must of necessity
join in the same writ of error; as they make but one party in consideration of law." Kennedy's Heirs v. Duncan, 3 Ky. (Hardin) 373.
The opposite result reached by the principal case and that of May's
Heirs v. Bennett, supra, may be disitnguished upon the two rules which
apply to the respective cases: One in case of general adverse possession
the other to cases of adverse possession in which the party holds under
a title of record. The distinction as stated by some text writers is:
"There is a difference in Kentucky between the general limitation law
and the seven year limitation as to adverse possession. The latter
saves the right which descends to heirs, if any of them are under disability, differing from the general law that all must be under a disability to save the right of any. Harlanv. Seaton, 18 B. Mon. 312; Ashbrook v. Quarles, 15 B. Mon. 20; Whington v. Taylor, 8 Dana 403; SoutA
v. Thomas, 7 T. B. Mon. 59; McIntyre v. Funk, 5 Liteli (Ky.) 33."
It seems that the facts of the principal case would have warranted
the court in following the rule applicable to the construction of Sec.
2513 Ky. Stats. inasmuch as the appellees in this case entered by a partition proceeding and held their lands by deeds duly recorded. Its
practical effects, however, are the same, since at the time of the accrual
of the action to the appellants all were under disability. The rule that
was followed by the court was indeed far more favorable to the cause
C. P. R.
of the appellees than the rule suggested would have been.
MINES

AND

MIXuEALS-STRIOT

PERFORMANCE

OF

A

CONTRACT

IN

MAT=T.X OF MAKING PAYMENT HELD WAIVED, AND HENCE AGREEMENT TO
ACCEPT TARDY PAYMENT, POVIDED ADDITIONAL PAYMENT WAS WITHOUT
CoNsimEmTIioN.-Plaintiff entered into an escrow agreement with defendants relative to the sale of an oil and gas lease. The payments
were to be made on the first of each month at noon. The agreement
contained a provision that if the payments were not made at the time
named plaintiff could treat the contract null and void and retain previous payments. The second payment came due on August first. One
of defendants met plaintiff on the street at 11 a. m. and informed him
that the money for the payment had not arrived at the bank. Plaintiff
replied that "he would not be contentious about a few hours delay."
The money not being paid on the morning of the third, plaintiff was
going to treat the lease void. He then entered into an agreement
whereby he agreed tb accept that payment two days late, providing an
additional payment was made on December first. This additional payment was never made and plaintiff sues to collect it. Held: That plaintiff's statement was a waiver of strict performance and his agreement
to accept payment two days late providing additional payment be made
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was without consideration. Davenport v. Anderson, 216 Ky. 22, 287 S.
W. 25.
Wherever time is made essential to the performance of an agreement either by the nature of the subject matter or by express stipulation, the party entitled to insist upon such performance may waive his
right thereto, either expressly or by conduct inconsistent with the purpose on his part to regard the contract as still subsisting. American
Mortgage Co. v. Williams, 103 Ark. 484, 145 S. W. 234.
The rule is stated even stronger by the Illinois court. Where before
the expiration of the time originally fixed for performance the time is
extended, though without consideration, performance within the extended time is sufficient. Thayer v. Meeker, 98 IIl. 470. This rule is
followed in other jurisdictions. New American Oil & Mining Co. v.
Troyer, 166 Ind. 402, 76 N. E. 253; Hukill v. Myers, 36 W. Va. 639, 15
S. E. 151. This seems especially applicable to the present case since
there was no consideration for plaintiff's statement.
There can be no doubt that plaintiff by his statement waived payment on the lease by noon. Defendant had another hour in which to
act and might have made other arrangements for the payment of the
sum by noon. He certainly had a right to rely on plaintiff's state,
ment that he would not be contentious about a few hours delay. Plaintiff, having thus waived his right to a punctual performance and his
right to forfeiture for tardy performance, had nothing to offer or give
defendant for the latter's promise to make an additional payment.
The decision of the court seems correct on principles of justice and
is in accord with the rule as expressed by the courts of other jurisdictions.
R. R. R.
MINES AND MIrNERA s-T NDER COAL LEASE GRANTING ALL NEcEssARr
RIGnTs TO SUCCESSFUL MINING or "TmIs CoAl," HELD THAT LESSEES WERE
NOT ENTITLED TO BRING CO.rL TO SURrACE F'ROm ADJOINING LEASE, AND
liSE STRUCTURES AND EQUIPM NT ON LEssoR's PROPERTY TO PREPARE IT FO

MAvTr.-Plaintiff's predecessor in title and his wife executed to defendant a coal lease covering 100 acres of land owned by him, known as
the Hays lease, which was adjacent to another lease owned by defendant. Defendant connected the two leases by underground passages.
The grantors in the lease died and plaintiffs, their children, inherited
and now own the tract of land and the benefits arising in favor of the
grantors under the Hays lease. By the terms of the lease in question,
the Hays lease, the lessorv granted to the lessees "all the necessary
rights and privileges to the successful mining of this coal." Defendant
claims the right under the Hays lease to bring the coal from its adjoining lease to the surface through the shafts and openings on the
Hays lease and there by means of its structures and equipment on the
Hays lease to clean, screen and load it for market. This suit was
brought to enjoin defendant from so doing. Held, lessees were not
entitled to bring coal to the surface through shaft on leased premises
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from adjoining lease. Moore, et al. v. Lackey Mining Company, 215 Ky.
71, 284 S. W. 413.
The doctrine is well established that one who owns the fee in coal
or one who merely removes it as lessee or licensee has the right during
the time that he may under his deed or lease mine coal from a given
tract of land to use the underground passages or gangways made by
removing the coal from the chamber containing it for transporting
coal from other lands owned by or under lease to him. Consolidated
Coal Company v. Schmisseur, 135 Ill. 371, 25 N. E. 795; Lillibridge v.
Tackawanna Coal Company, 143 Pa. 293, 22 Atl. 1035; Wadsworth Coal
Company v. Silver Creek Mineral Railroad Company, 40 Ohio St. 559;
New York Coal Company v. Hillside Iron Company, 225 Pa. 211, 74 Atl.
26. But this doctrine is limited in its application to the respective
rights of the parties as regards the underground passages made by removing the coal. Westerman v. Pa. Salt Mfg. Co., 260 Pa. 140, 103 AtM
E39, 15 A. L. R. 943; Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co., 75 Ohio St. 493,
80 N. E. 6.
But there is a marked distinction between the use of the underground passages made in removing coal, whether owned or under lease,
and the use of the surface. The principles governing the two cases are
different in origin and application. The extent of the right to use the
surface of leased premises in connection with adjacent mining operations is determined in only two ways: First, by express grant. Wads.
worth Coal Co. v. Silver Creek Mining Co., 40 Ohio St. 559. Second,
by necessary implication. Madison v. Garfield Coal Co., 114 Ia. 56, 86
N. W. 41; Blue Grass Corp. v. Combs, 168 Ky. 437, 182 S. W. 207. Therefore, unless expressly granted or necessarily implied, a mining lessee
can not use his surface rights and privileges on one lease in taking out
and marketing the minerals on an adjoining lease owned by him. Brasfie7d v. Burwcll Coal Co., IS5, 60 Southern 382. On the other hand, the
lessee of mineral rights has the privilege by virtue of his ownership
thereof to use the gangways and passageways cut through the mineral
lying under the leased premises for the purpose of going to and removing mineral owned by the lessee under adjacent lands. St. Louis Con.
solidated Coal Co. v. Schmisseur, 135 Ill. 371, 25 N. U. 795; Pruett v.
O'Gara Coal Co., 165 Ill. App. 470. Thus it is evident that the right to
use the passageways made by removing the mineral is based on the
ownership of the space it occupies while the right to use the surface
Is based on express or necessarily implied grant in the instrument under
which the lessee claims. This is the only logical conclusion to be drawn
from the decision on this point.
The distinction between surface rights and the right to use underground passages and gangways made by removing coal from the space
originally containing it is decisive of the principal case. This question
has not been considered by the Kentucky court before. However, the
result is in accord with the leading caseg of other jurisdictions. In
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the future we may expect the Kentucky court to follow the doctrine laid
down therein in its entirety and without modification or limitation.

W. D. S.
MuNioIPAL CoRponAaIoNs-LIAulnr or CITY FOR DA3AGES TO LAND
3Y FLOW OF WATER CAUSED BY CLEANING OUT DAIN A QUESTION Fon THE

Juny.-Before the city of Fort Thomas became a municipality, a private
land company laid out a subdivision, and built catch-basins and drains
in and across the two streets on which the appellant's two adjoining
lots are located. The evidence showed that at the time the appellant
purchased the lots the drain on her premises was covered by grass and
not functioning; that no water had flowed through it for twenty years.
A workman for the appellee while repairing the city streets and sewers
found the drain and cleaned it out, thereby causing water from surrounding territory to flow on and damage the appellant's property.
The city contended that it had not adopted the drains laid by the
private company as a part of its sewerage, but merely cleaned out the
drain. The lower court directed a verdict for the city.
The Court of Appeals held that the case disclosed by the evidence
was not one where the city left the drainage as It was, but one where
no injury would have resulted had it not been for the independent and,
affirmative action taken by the city; that the question of the city's
liability should have been left to the jury. Hewling v. Cityl of Fo7t
Thomas, 213 Ky. 734, 281 S. W. 981.
It has been held that a municipality is liable for misfeasance or
nonfeasance in the performance of its duty to exercise reasonable care
in the maintenance of its sewers, drains, and watercourses and to keep
them in reasonable repair and free from obstruction. City of Louisville
v. Gimpell, 22 K. L. R. 1110, 59 S. W. 1096; Sprangler v. San Francisco,
84 Cal. 12, 23 P. 1091; Burnside v. Ev'erett, 186 Mass. 4, 71 N. E. 82. In
Tate v. City of St. Paul, 56 Minn. 527, 58 N. W. 158 the court said that
if a sewer, whatever its plan, is so constructed as to cause a positive
and direct invasion of private property, as by collecting and throwing
upon it, to its damage, water or sewage which would not otherwise have
flowed or found its way there, the corporation is liable. Here in the
principal case the appellee has not only done an independent act not
necessary in the cleaning of its sewers, but has caused water that otherwise would have escaped the appellant's premises to be thrown thereon.
It seems that the modern view is that where the damage is called by a
direct invasion on the plaintiff's property that the municipality wil be
(Dillion on Municipality Corporations, sections 1087-1092).
liable.
From the modern trend it appears that the court was correct in holding that the evidence in the principal case was sufficient to have allowed
3. S. F.
the question of the city's liability to have gone to the jury.
NEGLIGENCE--IN-FANT CHASING GUINEAS, RELEASED BY STORE ron AD-

VERTISING PURPOSES, ASSUMED THE RISK OF INjuXy.-Appellant owned
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and operated a department store. For the purpose of advertising his
store he announced through the press that he would conduct a guinea
race in which the successful participants were to receive the fowls which
were to be the subject of the chase together with certain money prizes.
The appellee was a minor, being sixteen years and eleven months of
age, and was possessed of ordinary intelligence and physique. Upon
the day of the chase a great crowd assembled to participate threein.
Among the more active participants Was the appellee, and who during
the rush and excitement of the chase tripped to the sidewalk and was
painfully and seriously injured. He brought his action against the
owner of the store for the injuries that he had sustained by reason of
the appellant's negligent conduct. Held, that the appellee assumed the
risks of the undertaking and was thereby barred from recovery. McLeod
Store v. Vinson, 213 Ky. 667, 281 S. W. 799.
On appeal the court declared that "an excited crowd chasing
guineas for a series of prizes upon a congested street would obstruct
the street and cause inconvenience and some danger to travelers and
this would render one causing such commotion liable to a traveler exercising due care in the proper use of the street for any injuries inflicted
upon him by the racers. It may also be assumed that the appellee was
not guilty of any contributory negligence per se while engaged in
the race. But a serious question to be considered is whether under the
facts stated it should be held as a matter of law that he assumed the
dangers ordinarily attendant upon the race in which he entered. In
this he was a voluntary participant. There was no danger to him whatever while standing in the courthouse yard and aside from joining in
the race he had no occasion to go upon the street or pavement. The
anticipated danger was as obvious to him as it was to the appellant. It
is clear that in entering the race he assumed the ordinary risks incident
thereto and is thereby barred from recovery in this action."
Conrad v. Springfield Consolidated Ry. Co., 240 Ill. 12, 88 N. E. 180,
130 Am. St. Rep. 241, was an action brought by an employee of a telephone company against a street railway company for injuries received
while in the telephone company's employment. A wire which the plaintiff was mending came in contact with a high voltage electric wire of
the railway company. It served as a conductor for the electricity from
which he suffered severe burns and injuries. There was a city ordinance which required that the defendant should maintain guard wires
over its trolley line at all junctions with wires of other companies.
The railway company had failed to maintain its wires at this point.
The court held that the plainti ffcould recover damages fdr the injuries
sustained. Upon the defendants' contention that the plaintiff assumed
the risks of the danger the court ruled that the dodtrine of assumption
of risks applied only to eases arising between master and servant.
The case of Thomas v. Quartermaine, L. R. 18 Q. B. Div. 685, was
an action by a servant under the employers' liability act of 1880 (43 &
44 Vict. c. 42), S 1 sub-s. 1 to recover for injuries received while in the
defendant's employment. The plaintiff was employed in a cooling room

256

KENTUCKy LAW JouRNAL

of the defendants' brewery. In the room there was a boiling vat and-a
cooling vat and between them there was a passage about three feet
wide. The cooling vat had a rim about two feet high, but there was no
fencing around it. The plaintiff, while attempting to remove a board
from beneath the heating vat, lost his balance and fell into the cooling
vat and was severely scalded. The court held that, although the employers' liability act had deprived the defendant of one of his common
law defenses, the assumption of risk by the servant by virtue of his
contractual relation to the defendant, the defense .arising from the
maxim "vioZenti non fit injuria" had not been affected by the act, and
applied in the present case. Therefore, there was no evidence of negligence arising out of a breach of duty on the part of defendant towards
the plaintiff and for that reason the plaintiff could not rocover.
The rule in the principal case follows the weight of authority that
one can avail himself of the defense expressed in the maxim violenti
non fit injuria. "One who knowing and appreciating a danger, voluntarily assumes the risk of it. has no just cause of complaint against
another who is primarily responsible for the existence of the danger."
O'Malley v. South Boston Gaslight Co., 158 Mass. 135, 32 N. E. 1119, 47
U. P. R.
L. R. A. 161.
I\EGLIENcE---MANUFACTUaER OF INHERENTLY DANGEnous ARICLE XS
LIABLE TO ULTIMATE CONSUMR ron INIURY FROM NEGLIGENCE IN IMNANUFACTURING, PACKING OR MtARKETING ARTIcLE WITHOUT DUE WARNING.On July 7, 1924, A, an infant, engaged in cooling bottles of soft drinks
in a tank of ice water, sustained severe injuries to her wrist and the extensor tendons of the four fingers of her right hand were severed, when
a bottle of coco-cola exploded. In a suit by her next friend against the
coco-cola company, she recovered a judgment. The defendant company
appealed and insisted that the court erred in not directing a verdict in
its favor. Held, plaintiff could recover. Coco-Cola Bottling Works v.
Shelton, 214 Ky. 118, 282 S. W. 778.
The general rule is that the manufacturei' and seller of an article
which is essentially dangerous to a person or property owes a duty to
the public to use care in its manufacture, that it shall not be unnecessarily dangerous; but with respect to articles not of such dangerous
nature his only liability for negligence is to the party with whom he
contracts. Standard Oil Co. v. Murray, 119 Federal 572; .Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. v. McMath's Acmr., 148 Ky. 265, 146 S. W. 770.
However, there are exceptions to the general rule. Where the article manufactured is inherently or intrinsically dangerous to life or
limb a manufacturer is liable to the ultimate consumer for the injuries
which result from the manufacturer's negligence in manufacturing or
packing or putting upon the market without due warning. The liability here does not arise out of contract or deceit, but is based upon the
fundamental proposition that where a person sustains such relations
to society that danger to others will result from a failure to use due
care in his activities he owes a legal duty of such care to that class
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of persons likely to be injured by his failure to exercise it. Huset v.
J. . Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Federal 685. One who puts on
the market inherently or intrinsically dangerous to life owes a duty
of care to all persons who ought reasonably to have been foreseen as
likely to use them. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, 212 U. S. 159.
Another exception to the general proposition is where the manufacturer is liable to third parties when he is negligent in the manuacture of an article inherently or intrinsically dangerous to health,
life or limb, or when he sells an article for general use which he knows
to be dangerous and unsafe and conceals from the purchaser defects in
its construction from which injury that might reasonably be expected
to happen to persons using it. Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616,
140 S. W. 1047.
The Kentucky courts have followed the exceptions to the general
rule stated by several leading cases and the results reached in its
S. G. C.
decisions was undoubtedly correct.
NEW TnRAi-TAKING JUDG1N17T AGAINST POOLaE,

AFTER LEADING

IMnTo BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE SETTLEMENT OF CLAMrm Foa BEAoH OF

POOLING AGREEMENT WrizuoUT LITIGATION, HELD FRAUD ENTITLING HIM

To NEv TnRTA.Appellee had breached a pooling contract with appellant, and appellant brought an action for the breach. Before judgment
in the case, the attorney for appellant had, in discussing the possibility
of a compromise and settlement, led appellee to believe the matter
could be settled without litigation. Notwithstanding this, the attorney
for appellant took judgment against appellee before the parties had
even met and discussed the proposed compromise. Held, that appellee
is entitled to a new trial as provided by Civil Code of Practice, section
518, subdivision 4, regardless of whether he alleged in terms that attorneys' conduct was fraudulent. Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-Operative
Association v. Bevins, 216 Ky. 121, 187 S. W. 355.
The attitude of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in regard to the
granting of a new trial on such grounds is unequivocally expressed in
Stamper v. Forman-EarZe Co., 158 Ky. 324, 164 S. W. 937. In that case
the court said: "This court has been very liberal in granting new trials
where a party has been misled by statement or conduct of the opposing party or his counsel, and on that account failed to make a defense."
But it may well be noted that the court, in that case, held that there
must be a definite agreement on the part of both parties to settle out
of court; -the expressed wish of the complaining party to settle out of
court was held not to be sufficient. Was there any "definite agreement"
in the instant case? Possibly there is a nearer approach to an agreement in that the appellee, after a conference between himself and appellants' attorney in which the latter informed the former that he
would notify him as soon as the representative of the co-operative
association came, and after the attorney had so notified him of the arrival of the representative, went at once to the office of the association
to meet the representative. Appellee was told that the representative
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had left but would return. This affirmative act on the part of the appellee in acting on the attorneys' notification makes a nearer approach
to an agreement than is found in the earlier case in which there was no
assurance other than silence given that the plaintiff's proposal to attempt to settle would be agreeable. But in neither case can there be said
to be a "definite agreement." The atitude of the Kentucky court is
further illustrated in Hayden v. Moore, 4 Bush 107, and Winkler v.
Peters,142 Ky. 83, 133 S. W. 1144.
Courts in other jurisdictions where there are statutes almost identical with the one in this state have evidenced a like attitude; State v.
Omaha Country Club, 78 Neb. 178, 110 N. W. 693; Lanier v. Nunnaly &
Co., 128 Ga. 328, 57 S. R. 689; Young v. Lindquist, 126 Minn, 414, 148
N. W. 455. Taking into consideraiton both the facts of this case and
the general tendency of the Kentucky court to give effect to the manifest intent of a statute we may well say that the decisidn is correct.
To this may be added as a further proof of the correctness of the decision the fact that courts generally are apt to search for some ground
whereby a party may be relieved of a judgment procured by fraud,
whether there is a statute or not. Chamberlainv. Lindsay, 1 Hun. 231,
G. R.

RAmROAs-quE ABoUT TO CRoss RAII0oAD MAY
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Wr HOUT

RELY ON WARN-

STOPPInG, LooxNG AND

LisTEMNnG.Appellee recovered a judgment in the lower court against
the railroad company for personal injuries received in a collision between one of defendants' passenger trains and a truck which appellee
was driving. The railroad contended that it was entitled to a directed
verdict at the close of the testimony on the ground "that one about to
cross the tracks of a railroad company at grade on a public highway
must 'stop ,look and listen." The court refused the directed verdict
and appellant appealed. Judgment was given for appellee. Louisville
& N. R. Co. v. Johnson, 214 Ky. 189, 282 S. W. 1087.
It is the common law duty of those in charge of trains, for a nonperformance of which the railroad company is responsible, when approaching a public crossing to give notice of their approach by all reasonable warnings, such as blowing a whistle, ringing a bell, signal
lights, or by such other devices as may be sufficient to give timely
warning to travelers of their approach, so as to afford time for all approaching to stop in a place of safety or if on the track to get out of
danger. Louisville R. Co. v. Morris, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 466, 20 S. W. 539.
In accord with the above general rule it is the duty of those in
charge of a train to give due and proper warnings of its approach, that
those in crossing its track may know and avoid the danger; and when
passing great thoroughfares thronged with travel, the speed of the
train should be checked, or other means devised to insure the safety of
those on the highway, and a failure to givd such warning, or to use such
precaution, must be regarded as negligence. Paducah and Memphis
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Railroad Co. v. Hoeh, 12 Bush 45; Cla dns' Admr. v. Lexington and
Big Sandy Railroad, 13 Bush 642.
In the case of L. & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush 338, the
court said: "It is the duty of a railroad company to cause signals to be
given where the safety of travelers on intersecting roads demands that
a warning should be given of approaching trains." Where a street
crossing over railroad tracks is used by many persons, and is more
than ordinarily dangerous to such persons, the company, in addition to
the usual signals, must provide such signals as are reasonably necessary to give notice of a train's approach to the crossing. Southern Ry.
I7o. v. Winchester, 32 Ky. L. R. 19, 105 S. W. 167. It is the duty of a
railroad company to use reasonable care and give proper signals on
the approach of its trains, in passing through a populated portion of a
city. Louisville R. Co. 19 Ky. L. R. 1900, 44 S. W. 1112.
Heretofore, where the railroad company has failed to give such
warnings at its crossings, the above decisions have deemed the railroad
company negligent and gave the injured parties a right to recover.
However, the last General Assembly enacted the following statute,
section 4353b-I, which provides :"UNs&rE GRADE CROSSINGS; DUTIEs or
DRivs.--That whenever in this state the main track or tracks of any
railroad or interurban railway shall cross at grade a public highway,
the State Highway Commission may designate such crossing as 'unsafe,'
and it shall be unlawful for the driver of any vehicle to cross such
crossing without first bringing such vehicle to a full stop at not less
than ten (10) feet, nor more than thirty (30) feet from the nearest rail
of such track or tracks. The phrase 'main track or tracks,' as used in
this section, shall mean any railroad or interurban track or tracks over
which regularly scheduled trains or cars are operated." (March 19, 1926,
c. 114, p. 388, I.)
It is worthy of note that the Kentucky statute varies from the usual statute of this type in that it limits the "stop, look and listen!"
rule to crossings designated as "unsafe" by the highway commission.
There is no evidence in the instant case that the highway on which the
accident occurred had been so designated by the highway commission.
But even if the highway had been so designated, the statute would not
be applicable to a case arising before its passage. The statute was
passed March 19, 1926, while the decision in this case was rendered by
the Court of Appeals April 27, 1926. While the date on which the injury
was incurred is not given in the case, it is evident that it was prior to
the passage of the statute.
S. G. C.
STATUTES-STATUTE PROHIBITING EMPLOYMENT OF MINOS IN STREET
OCCUP.TIONS IN COIES OF SECOND AND Tunu CrAss HELD NoT UicoNsTrrOTIoNAL .As LocAL oR SPECIAL Lsrsr io.- -Defendants are agents
of daily newspapers circulating in the city of Covington. Defendants
sold newspapers for cash to two boys under fourteen years of age with
the understanding that the boys intended to sell the same for profit,
and that the boys did actually sell the papers at a profit to themselves.
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The boys attended school regularly and the papers were sold after
school hours. In a prosecution by the Commonwealth for violation of
section 331a-15, Kentucky Statutes, -he defendants contended that the
statute is unconstitutional in that it contravenes section 59 of the Constitution. Held, that the statute is not unconstitutional as contravening section 59 of the Constitution. Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 213 Ky.
618, 281 S. W. 805.
It is to be noted that the constitutional provision invoked by the
defendants concerns the limitations upon the state legislature in passing local and special legislation on some twenty-odd specifically named
subjects. One of these subjects is labor, "to regulate labor, trade, mining or manufacturing," is denied the legislature in attempting local
or special legislation. The statute under question is a part of the
recently enacted Child Labor Laws of the state. The subsection specifically attacked prohibits street trades by boys in cities of the second and
third class .
This opinion reaffirms the position taken by the same court in the
case of Commonwealth v. Linginski, 212 Ky. 366, 279 S. W. 339, in,
which the court said: "Street occupations, such as the selling of newspapers, are confined to populous centers in big cities. There is, therefore, a natural and reasonable distinction to be made between such
occupations in such places from like callings in the country and small
towns. The General Assembly had a right to make such classification
based upon natural and reasonable distinctions." The court merely
applied, in that case, the general la as worked out clearly by a long line
of Kentucky cases to a different set of facts from any previously presented. Hodge v. Bryan, 149 Ky. 110, 14 8S. W. 21; City of Louisvi~le v.
Coulter, 177 Ky. 242, 197 S. W. 819; Commonwealth v. Ward, 136 Ky.
155, 123 S. W. 673; Lakes v. Goodloe, 195 Ky. 240, 242 S. W. 632. Courts
of other jurisdictions have likewise recognized the right of the legislature to make such classification based upon natural and reasonable distinctions. Hyvonen v. Hector Iron Co., 103 Minn. 331, 115 N. W. 167;
Patstone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138. Text writers also have recognized the practical importance of allowing this province to the legislatures. In Sutherlands' Statutory Construction, 2d edition, section
203, it is said: "It is agreed on all hands that the constitution does not
forbid a reasonable and proper classification of the objects of legislation." It takes no great amount of insight to see that such a holding
is salutary as well as founded upon authority.
G. R.
TAXATION-WH nRE PROPERTY Is LsTED AND SOLD Im NAMiE OF TRuSTEE NOT RnAT. PARTY IN INTEREST, PURO3ASER AT TAX SALE DOES NO4
AcQuIE TiTLE, BUT MERELY LiEN FOR AMOUNT OF TAXES, INTEREST AIn

PExNTIEs.-The appellee, having purchased lands at a tax sale, insti-tuted this action against the appellants, trustees, to obtain possession of
the land so purchased, claiming to be owner of the fee simple by reason
of the sheriff's tax deed. The appellants denied the ownership and right
of possession of the appellee upon the ground that the land sold for tax-
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ation was never properly listed for taxation in the name of the true
owners; that the property was listed in the name of the trustees while
the ownership was in others, and that the sale was void because made
for more than the true amount of the taxes, penalty and cost. Held, that
did not acquire title but merely a lien for the amount of the taxes, interest and penalties. Shawler v. Carter, 215 Ky. 601, 286 S. W. 779.
In the case of Spaulding v. Thompson, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 836, the
property of the wife was sold for the taxes of the husband, and the
court held that laud owned by the wife shoul(I be listed for taxation in
her name and not in that of the husband; and where it was assessed
and sold for taxation as the property of the husband, the purchaser
did not acquire the title of the wife.
"Reasonable diligence should be required of the assessor in listing,
or causing to be listed, land in the name of the proper person, and
where land is listed in the name of a person who is neither owner nor
agent, the sheriff cannot sell it for taxes and pass a valid title to the
purchaser." Wheeler v. Branel, 10 Ky. Law Rep. 301. In Smith v.
Ryan, 88 Ky. 636, the court said: "A tax sale for anything more than
is lawfully chargeable is a sale without jurisdiction, and therefore
void. If for more than is due, it is an excess of jurisdiction." This
same doctrine was followed in Fisl. v. Genelt, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 177;
Husbands v. Poiivick, 128 Ky. 652; Kenti ky Lands Investment Co. v.
Lowery, 146 Ky. 537.
"As the tax sale at which the appellant became the purchaser was
void because the land was sold for more than was due as taxes, penalty
and costs, it follows that the appellant did not acquire any title to the
land, either by the certificate of purchase given him by the sheriff or
by the tax deed made by the sheriff; all that she became entitled to by
virtue of her purchase was a lien upon the land for the amount paid
at the tax sale." Collins v. Lane, 151 Ky. 8.
It is manifest that the court has followed the well established rule
in this state in rendering this decision.
M. W. M.
TBUSTS-ENFORCEMIENT OP PAROL AGREEMENT, IN

CONSIDERATION FOR

CONVEYANCE TO SELL AND DmDE PROCEEDS AMONG OTR s is NOT PREVENTED BY STATUTE or FRAUDS.-A deed by which the defendant's father

conveyed land to the defendant purported to lie an absolute grant for
valuable consideration. No consideration was in fact paid, the conveyance having been made pursuant to an agreement between the defendant and his father that the defendant would hold the land in trust for
his father, and would, upon the death of his father, sell the land and
divide the proceeds among his brothers and sisters. This bill is brought
by the fathers' administrator and the defendants' brothers and sisters
to compel specific performance of this oral agreement to sell and
convey. Held, that the Statute of Frauds is no bar to enforcement of
this parol agreement. Newton v. Newton's Administrator, et al., 214
Ky. 278, 283 S. W. 83.
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If A convey to B by a deed absolute on its face and recites tlhat
consideration has been paid, the real and only consideration being an
oral agreement that B shall convey to C, the almost universal rule is
that C cannot enforce the parol agreement, since the action is barred
by the Statute of Frauds. Stout v. Stout, 165 Iowa 552, 146 N. W. 474;
Ohesser v. Mates, 180 Ala. 563, 61 So. 267; Kinley v. Thelen, 158 Cal.
175, 110 Pac. 513. Most courts also hold that the statute is a bar to an
action 1by A to recover the land from B, and refuse to give relief either
upon the express trust or upon grounds of a constructive trust. Craw.
ford v. Workman, 64 W. Va. 19, 61 S. E. 322; N~icholas v. Capen, 79'
Wash. 120, 139 Pac. 868; Woodford v. Tarnham, 44 Minn. 159, 46 N. W.
295.
In a few jurisdictions A is allowed to recover the land from B.
Such an action is clearly not upon an express agreement, but proceeds
upon the theory that B is unjustly enriched, and to prevent a fraud the
courts restore the statu quo ante.
Dol v. Doll, 96 Neb. 185, 147 N. W. 471; Lang v. Lang, 131 N. Y.
S. 891; Hal v. Linn, 8 Col. 264, 5 Pac. 641. This rule is supported by both
justice and logic, while the rule which allows C to enforce the trust
seems to be an Invasion of the[ State of Frauds. For to allow C to
recover is clearly upon an express oral contract to convey, for C not
having parted with anything is not injured, and for this reason the law
will not raise a constructive trust in his .favor. The theory of the constructive trust is to prevent a party suffering injury by the fraud of
another. This is the theory set out in the English courts in denying C
an action, but restoring to A the property fraudulently taken or withheld from him. Haigh v. KaVne, L. R. 7 Ch. 469; Booth v. Turle, L. R.
16 Eq. 182. The Massachusetts court allows A to recover the value of
the land, but not the land itself. Twomey v. Crawley, 137 Mass. 284.
In the case of a devise to B upon an oral agreement that B would
transfer to C, many courts have gone further than they would In the
case of gifts inter vivos, and allow C to enforce the oral agreement.
Campbell v. Brown, 129 Mass. 23. But see contra, Moore v. Campbell,
102 Ala. 445. A small minority view is to extend this rule to apply to
transfer inter vivos, provided that the grantor is dead. For then, as
in the case of a devise, the grantor cannot carry out his purpose to aid
the intended beneficiary. Dieckman v. Merkh, 20 Cal. App. 655, 130
Pac. 27; Ahrens v. Jones, 169 N. Y. 555, 62 N. E. 666; Becker v. Neurath,
149 Ky. 421, 149 S. W. 857.
The early Kentucky rule was to refuse to enforce such an oral
agreement. It was then held that a parol agreement could not operate
to make an absolute deed have the effect of a mortgage. Harper v.1
Harper, 5 Bush 176. Such a transaction is in close analogy to the present situation, being a transfer to B upon an oral agreement that he will
reconvey when his grantor should pay an existing debt. But a parol
agreement is now competent to show that an absolute deed was intended
only as a mortgage. Brown v. Opradlin, 136 Ky. 703, 125 S. W. 150.
This Is authority for the proposition that one who makes a grant with-

CASS COMMENTS

263

out consideration may recover against his grantee upon an oral agreement to reconvey, but is no authority for the proposition that a third
person for whose benefit the agreement was made can sue upon it. The
reason has been pointed out above. Again, in the case of Usher v. Flood,
83 Ky. 552, the court refused to go the extent of the principal case,
holding that there was no action upon an express oral agreement, but
that remedy would be by way of constructive trust to restore the parties
to their original status. This rule was followed in the case of Rain
v. Stone, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 301. But in the case of Becker v. Neurath,
supra, the court laid down the rule which is followed in the principal
case.
The fact that the seventh section of the English statute of frauds
has never been enacted in this state cannot affect the rule as to agreements to sell and reconvey lands, for this is covered by the sixth section of the English statute, which has been copied into our statutes.
Gaylor v. Gaylor, 150 N. C. 222, 63 S. E. 1028; Neill v. McClung, 76 S. E.
B. D.
878, 71 W. Va. 458.
WILLS-UNDUE INFLUENCE iS SUCH AS DEsTRoYs FEE AGENCY OF
THE TEsTATon, AND DOES NOT INCLUDE THAT OBTAINED BY KINDNESS
APPEAL

TO FEELINGS, UNDERSTANDING

Oin

OR AFECTION wHici" DOES NOT

DESTROY FIEE AGENoY.-A died November 3, 1922. She left no issue
and under the statute her estate would have been divided among surviving brothers and sisters and their heirs. By an instrument dated
July 23, 1913, she devised practically all her estate to her niece. The
instrument was admitted to probate, and thereafter the brothers and
sisters of the testator instituted this action.
The insructions which the court gave to the jury were: "Undue
influence, as used in these instructions, Is such an influence as obtains
dominion over the mind of the testator to such an extent that it destroys free agency on his part in the disposal of his estate and constrains him in respect thereto to do that which he would not have done
if left to the free exercise of his own judgment. But any reasonable in.
fluence obtained by acts of kindness, or that appeal to the feelings, or to
the understanding, or to the affections, and not destroying free agency,
is not undue influece." To these instructions contestants objected and
offered others which were refused. Because of this refusal the contestants appealed. Held, that the instructions given were correct.
Clore, et al. v. Argue, et al., 213 Ky. 644, 281 S. W. 1005.
Undue influence is not that influence which is obtained by modest
persuasion or by arguments addressed to the understanding, or by mere
appeal to the affections; it must be an influence obtained either by
flattery, excessive importunity, or threats, or in some other mode by
which a dominion is acquired over the will of the testator, destroying
his free agency, and constraining him to do, against his free will, what
he is unable to refuse. 2 Greenleaf 688, Harrisons' Case, 1 B. Monroe
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In the case of Lucas v. Cannon, 13 Bush 650, facts similar to those
in the principal case appeared and the court on the question of undue
influence said: "It is such an influence as is exercised by coercion, imposition, or fraud; not such as merely arises from the influence of gratitude, affection or esteem. It must be the ascendency of another will
over that of the testator by reason of coercion, imposition or fraud."
Undue influence cannot be inferred from the fact that a will is
partial or ujijust in its operations. Broaddus v. Broad-dus, 10 Bush 304.
To invalidate a will because of undue influence it is not necessary that
the influence be exerted at the time of making the will; it is suicient
that a controlling influence previously put in operation is still controlling the testator to the extent of destroying his free agency. Overall
S. G. .
v. Bland, 11 Ky. Law Rep. 371, 12 S. W. 273.

